



NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
TRANSPORTATION CENTER

Northwestern | Economics

Anticipatory Pricing to Manage “Flow Breakdown”

Jonathan D. Hall

University of Toronto


and

Ian Savage


Northwestern University

- Flow = density x speed


Fundamental diagram of traffic



Fundamental diagram of traffic



“Flow Breakdown”



Causes

- Weaving between lanes
- Excessively slow vehicles
- Aggressive driving
- Sharp brakeing
- Unusual weather
- Unusual visual distraction

Features

- Does not occur everyday (probabilistic)
- Precursor action more likely to result in breakdown at higher densities/flows
- Occurs when highway is operating at less than theoretical capacity


What it is not

- Backup caused by a downstream bottleneck now affecting this link
- Random traffic crashes that close some or all lanes
- Oversaturation of the link


Congestion pricing I

- Flow less than maximum capacity:
 - “normal congestion” (economists)
 - “undersaturated” (engineer)
- Has stable density/speed/flow relationship


Cost = $f(1/\text{speed})$



Cost = $f(1/\text{speed})$



Cost = $f(1/\text{speed})$



Congestion pricing II

- (In)flow greater than maximum capacity:
 - “hypercongested” (economists)
 - “oversaturated” (engineer)
- “Bottleneck” model
 - Dates to Vickrey in the 1960s
 - Modern version started with Arnott, De Palma and Lindsey, 1990

Congestion pricing II

- Bottleneck of fixed capacity
- If inflow to bottleneck exceeds capacity, then a queue develops
- Drivers suffer a travel time penalty in the queue

Congestion pricing II

- Bottleneck of fixed capacity
- If inflow to bottleneck exceeds capacity, then a queue develops
- Drivers suffer a travel time penalty in the queue
- Drivers endogenously select their departure time from “home” (discussed in a minute)
- May arrive at “work” earlier or later than they would like (disutility from this variation)

Congestion pricing II

- Bottleneck of fixed capacity
- If inflow to bottleneck exceeds capacity, then a queue develops
- Drivers suffer a travel time penalty in the queue
- Drivers endogenously select their departure time from “home” (discussed in a minute)
- May arrive at “work” earlier or later than they would like (disutility from this variation)
- Introduction of pricing shortens smooths inflow and makes drivers better off

Our objective

- Adapt the bottleneck model to deal with situations where the equilibrium flow is less than theoretical capacity:
 - “Good days” when drivers encounter no congestion
 - “Bad days” when breakdown occurs (a bottleneck become binding) and drivers encounter congestion in the form of a queue
- Make the probability of a “bad day” endogenous

How are you going to price?

- Option 1 – real time dynamic ex-post pricing to help highway recover on “bad days”
 - Need alternative routes
 - And/or people delay or not make trips or change mode

How are you going to price?

- Option 1 – real time dynamic ex-post pricing to help highway recover on “bad days”
 - Need alternative routes
 - And/or people delay or not make trips or change mode
- Option 1A – upstream sensors and traffic prediction models guess if and where breakdown is likely and price accordingly – Dong and Mahmassani (2013)

How are you going to price?

- Option 2 – Anticipatory pricing:
 - Same price on both good and bad days
 - Price set in advance so drivers know it in making departure time decisions
 - Drivers know in advance how traffic performs on both good and bad days
 - Drivers know the – endogenous – probability of a bad day
 - Hence choose their departure time from home

THE MODEL

Simplifications

- Morning peak
- Fixed “totally inelastic” number of commuters (Q) in single-occupancy cars
- Homogenous drivers (same utility function and tastes)
- Same desired arrival time at work (t^*)

Simplifications


- Single link between “home” and “work”
- “Home” is located immediately before a possible bottleneck
- “Work” is located immediately after the bottleneck
- So, free-flow travel time and vehicle operating costs are normalized to zero

Highway technology

- (Out)flow capacity of the bottleneck in non-breakdown state (V_K) is not binding on inflow $V_a(t)$ for any value of t on a good day
- If breakdown occurs, capacity falls to $V_{K'}$, which is binding on $V_a(t)$ for at least some values of t
- Then a vertical queue develops
- Highway remains in breakdown state until queue totally dissipates, then it resets


Probability of breakdown

Probability of Breakdown




Probability of breakdown

Probability of Breakdown



Probability of breakdown

Probability of Breakdown



When does breakdown occur?

- We will show that inflow $V_a(t)$ is highest earlier in the peak period
- Breakdown probability based on this maximum inflow
- If breakdown occurs at all, it happens immediately at the start of the peak
- Random drawing each morning based on endogenous probability
- Because on a bad day the queue does not dissipate until the end of peak, cannot have highway “recover” and then face possibility of relapse into breakdown
- So breakdown either at beginning of peak or not at all

Driver decision making

- All desire to get to work at t^*
- Chose departure time from home in continuous time t
- Departure time can be earlier than, same as, or later than t^*
- Objective is to minimize disutility (generalized cost) of their trip
- Equilibrium conditions:
 - No driver can shift departure time to improve their welfare
 - (implies that all drivers face same generalized cost)
 - Everyone who leaves home gets to work!

Generalized cost

- Some things normalized to zero
 - Free-flow travel time
 - Vehicle operating costs
- 1. Travel time delay (time in queue) valued at α
 - Note that on “good day” travel delay is zero
- 2. Schedule delay - work arrival time relative to t^*
 - if arrive at work early valued at β
 - if arrive at work late valued at γ
 - usual assumption that $\beta < \alpha < \gamma$
- 3. Time-varying toll $\tau(t)$

NO-TOLL BASE CASE

Three groups of commuters

- **Early:** arrive at work early or exactly “on time” on both good and bad days

Early commuters

$$c_g(t) = p(V_a^{\text{early}}) \{ \alpha T_{DB}(t) + \beta [t^* - (t + T_{DB}(t))] \} \\ + [1 - p(V_a^{\text{early}})] \beta (t^* - t)$$

Early commuters

$$c_g(t) = p(V_a^{\text{early}}) \{ \alpha T_{DB}(t) + \beta [t^* - (t + T_{DB}(t))] \} \\ + [1 - p(V_a^{\text{early}})] \beta (t^* - t)$$

Solve by:

$$\frac{\partial c_g(t)}{\partial t} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial T_{DB}(t)}{\partial t} = \frac{V_a^{\text{early}}}{V_{K'}} - 1$$

Early commuters

$$V_a^{early} = \left[\frac{\beta}{p(V_a^{early})(\alpha - \beta)} + 1 \right] V_{K'}$$

Three groups of commuters

- **Early:** arrive at work early or exactly “on time” on both good and bad days
- **Middle:** arrive at work early or exactly on time on good days and late on bad days

Middle commuters

$$c_g(t) = p(V_a^{\text{early}}) \{ \alpha T_{\text{DB}}(t) + \gamma [t + T_{\text{DB}}(t) - t^*] \} \\ + [1 - p(V_a^{\text{early}})] \beta (t^* - t)$$

Solve in similar fashion

Middle commuters

$$V_a^{middle} = \left[\frac{(1 - p(V_a^{early}))\beta - p(V_a^{early})\gamma}{p(V_a^{early})(\alpha + \gamma)} + 1 \right] V_{K'}$$

- $V_a^{middle} < V_a^{early}$

Three groups of commuters

- **Early:** arrive at work early or exactly “on time” on both good and bad days
- **Middle:** arrive at work early or exactly on time on good days and late on bad days
- **Late:** arrive at work late on both good and bad days

Late commuters

$$c_g(t) = p(V_a^{\text{early}}) \{ \alpha T_{\text{DB}}(t) + \gamma [t + T_{\text{DB}}(t) - t^*] \} \\ + [1 - p(V_a^{\text{early}})] \gamma (t - t^*)$$

Solve in similar fashion

Late commuters


$$V_a^{late} = \left[\frac{-\gamma}{p(V_a^{early})(\alpha + \gamma)} + 1 \right] V_{K'}$$

- $V_a^{late} < V_a^{middle} < V_a^{early}$
- $V_a^{late} < V_{K'}$

The model

- Predetermined parameters: Q , α , β , γ , V_K , $V_{K'}$, distribution of $p(V_a^{\text{early}})$
- Just determined: V_a^{early} , V_a^{middle} , V_a^{late}
- Still to be determined:
 - t_q = departure time of earliest commuter
 - t_{em} = break point between early and middle group
 - ($t_{ml} = t^*$ = break point between middle and late group)
 - $t_{q'}$ = departure time of the last commuter
 - Q^{early} , Q^{middle} , Q^{late}

Time line (not to scale)



Can define a system of linear equations to solve for these

$$t_q = t^* - \frac{Q}{\left[1 + \frac{V_a^{middle}}{V_a^{late} - V_{K'}} \left(\frac{V_{K'}}{V_a^{early}} - 1 \right) \right] V_{K'}}$$

$$t_{em} = \frac{V_{K'}}{V_a^{early}} t^* + \left(1 - \frac{V_{K'}}{V_a^{early}} \right) t_q$$

Can define a system of linear equations to solve for these

$$T_{DB}(t^*) = \frac{V_a^{middle}}{V_{K'}} t^* - \frac{V_a^{middle}}{V_{K'}} t_{em}$$

$$t_{q'} = t^* - \frac{V_{K'}}{V_a^{late} - V_{K'}} T_{DB}(t^*)$$

Q^{early} , Q^{middle} , Q^{late} follow from these

OPTIMAL FINE TOLLS

The standard bottleneck model


- When inflow $>$ capacity even on a good day
- Set price schedule so there is a constant inflow equivalent to the bottleneck capacity (no queuing)
- For each driver the combined:
 - travel delay (eliminated by pricing)
 - schedule delay early or late
 - toll paidis the same (i.e, the less the schedule delay, the higher the toll)

In our model

- Set price schedule to regulate inflow so it a constant rate equivalent to the maximum expected bottleneck capacity

$$V_a^1 = \max\{[1 - p(V_a)]V_a + p(V_a)V_{K'}\}$$

New time line (not to scale)



Solving the model

- Both the very first (at t_r) and very last driver (at $t_{r'}$) pay zero toll, but suffer:
 - Schedule delay early and zero traffic delay (on both good and bad days) for first driver
 - Schedule delay late and a queue (on bad days) for last driver
 - These must be the same in equilibrium, denote as δ^1

Solving the model

- For first driver:

$$\begin{aligned}\delta^1 &= c_g(t_r) = \beta(t^* - t_r) \\ &= \beta Q \left\{ \frac{\gamma + p(V_a^1) \left[(\alpha + \gamma) \left(\frac{V_a^1}{V_{K'}} - 1 \right) \right]}{(\beta + \gamma)V_a^1} \right\}\end{aligned}$$

- Set toll schedule to increase the travel delay and schedule delay for all drivers to δ^1

Optimal toll schedule $\tau(t)$

Early: $t_r \leq t \leq t_{em}^1$

$$\delta^1 - \beta(t^* - t) - p(V_a^1) \{ (\alpha - \beta) [(V_a^1 / V_{K'}) - 1] (t - t_r) \}$$


Middle: $t_{em}^1 < t \leq t^*$

$$\begin{aligned} \delta^1 - [1 - p(V_a^1)] \beta(t^* - t) - p(V_a^1) \gamma(t - t^*) \\ - p(V_a^1) (\alpha + \gamma) [(V_a^1 / V_{K'}) - 1] (t - t_r) \end{aligned}$$

Late: $t^* < t \leq t_r$

$$\delta^1 - \gamma(t - t^*) + p(V_a^1) (\alpha + \gamma) [(V_a^1 / V_{K'}) - 1] (t - t_r)$$

Toll schedule (not to scale)



EXTENSIONS

Possible extensions

- Rather than at the start of the peak, breakdown may occur randomly within the peak
- Number of commuters (Q) is elastic
- Highway congestible (travel time increases with flow) even in a non-breakdown state
- Second best coarse toll

FINAL THOUGHTS

Summary and final thoughts

- Model with endogenous breakdown probability
- Get day-to-day travel time variability without stochastic demand
- Model describes reality where you are generally early or on time but occasionally late
- Applicable if departure time precommitted

Thank you

- Ian Savage: ipsavage@northwestern.edu
- Read the draft paper:
<http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ipsavage/440-manuscript.pdf>
Preliminary and incomplete, please do not cite

